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Abstract 
Emergency services  are  vital services  that Next Generation Networks (NGNs)  have  to 
provide.  As the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is in the heart of NGNs, 3GPP  has carried 
the burden  of specifying  a standardized IMS-based emergency  services  framework.  Unfor- 
tunately, like any other IP-based standards, the IMS-based emergency  service framework  is 
prone  to Distributed Denial  of Service (DDoS)  attacks.  We propose  in this work,  a simple 
but efficient solution that can prevent certain types of such attacks by creating firewall pin- 
holes that regular clients will surely be able to pass in contrast to the attackers clients.  Our 
solution was implemented, tested in an appropriate testbed, and its efficiency was proven. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The transition to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) is often coupled with the vision of innovative 
services providing personalized and customizable services over an all-IP infrastructure.  To enable 
a smooth transition, all the next generation IP networks need not only to support more services 
but also current vital services such as emergency services.  The latter simply means placing calls 
to police, ambulance  and fire brigade  to ask for assistance or to inform about an incident. 
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [2] is in the heart of the NGNs technologies and is certainly 
the future replacement of the current telecommunication networks.  As a consequence, 3GPP [3] 
has carried the burden  of specifying a standardized IMS-based emergency services framework as 
it will be discussed later on. 
Like any other communications network, emergency communications will be for sure the target 
of misuse and attacks. However, there are some special characteristics of the emergency services 
that allow the emergence of new kinds of attacks that are not visible in other  communications 
networks.  These characteristics are: 
Emergency  systems  are  special-purpose  networks  with  asymmetric network  behavior :  in 
case of a high-impact emergency event, the system will have to process a huge number  of 
requests, while at most other times there will be very few requests. 
 
Emergency  services  are  a  prioritized   service.    Emergency  messages  have  an  emergency 
indication  attached that guarantees  to the messages to be transported  immediately,  and 
should not be delayed by other traffic [17]. 
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Emergency  systems need to be available  all time  with few obstacles to the access.  This 
means  that all the relevant  information  should  be gathered  easily.   On  the other  hand, 
the system  should  be prevented  from misuse and  attacks, i.e.  the user might need to be 
authenticated.   These  two  goals are  mutually  exclusive  and  one has  to find a  trade off 
between them. 
 
Session Initiation Protocol [1] has established itself as the de-facto standard for VoIP services 
in the Internet and is the basis and key protocol of currently defined Next Generation Networks, 
like the IP  Multimedia  Subsystem  (IMS).  DoS  attacks against  the main  components  of the 
IMS-based  emergency  framework  are  a  serious  threat.   Through   excessive  message  flooding, 
either from regular accounts or generated by distributed attack tools, such attacks aim to render 
the emergency  service inoperable  by exceeding the components’ message processing  capability. 
Especially when the attack is conducted from multiple different sources (using so-called bot-nets) 
with seemingly valid and conforming SIP emergency messages, defence is a challenging problem, 
as the target Emergency  component needs to distinguish between valid SIP emergency messages 
from regular  users and  DoS messages from malicious users.  Such messages need to be dropped 
beforehand  to keep the service operational. 
The  aim  of this paper  is to introduce a  lightweight security mechanism  based  on firewall 
pinholing,  that effectively prevents many DDoS attacks on the IMS based emergency framework. 
Pinholing  is a common  firewall technique,  where the configuration of the border  firewall of 
the protected network is dynamically  updated depending  on current network traffic.  The firewall 
is initially configured to block most incoming traffic, but allows some exceptions (”pinholes”), so 
that traffic with special characteristics can pass the firewall barrier.   The  proposed  mechanism 
controls a firewall to generate pinholes  that are necessary  to effectively protect the emergency 
framework.    The  approach   shares  some  similarities with greylisting [15]  used  in  email  spam 
prevention, i.e. all incoming requests are initially held back by the firewall (they are ”greylisted”), 
and only forwarded to the destination if the sending entity follows the SIP emergency specification 
correctly.  Hence, with  our mechanism  we can deny access to all distributed  flooding bots  that 
do not meticulously follow the specification.  The  mechanism  cannot handle  all types of DDoS 
attacks, however it is especially effective against flooding bots that utilise spoofed IP addresses, 
a common  technique that attackers use to evade  detection.  Spoofed addresses  are  difficult to 
handle  with all current prevention mechanisms. 
We will introduce basic concepts later  in the document,  including  IMS, emergency  support 
for IMS, DoS, firewalls and greylisting.  We will examine our work in the context of current state 
of the art. We will then explain  our mechanism  in detail and  show performance  measurements 
within our  prototype security solution and  test bed.   We  will conclude  with possibilities for 
optimisation and will give hints about further work. 
 
 
2 Background Information 
 
2.1  IMS Overview 
 
The  IP  Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)  is the key enabler  in the mobile world for providing  rich 
multimedia  services to the end-users.   IMS first  appeared  in 3GPP  release  5 of the evolution 
from 2G to 3G networks ”from  W-CDMA  to UMTS”.   This  release  supports both GSM  and 
GPRS  networks. In 3GPP release 6, interworking with WLAN was added.  3GPP release 7 adds 
support for fixed networks, together with TISPAN  [4], this collaboration allowed the adoption of 
a more generalized  model able to address  a wider variety of network and  service requirements. 
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Figure  1: IMS architecture 
 
 
The  IMS underlying  network architecture can be divided  into three main  layers:  Access Layer, 
Control Layer and Service Layer (see Figure  1). 
 
The  access layer  consists  of IP  routers  and  legacy PSTN  switches  that provide  access to 
the IMS network both from contemporary IP  telephony devices and  older circuit switch 
devices respectively.  IP devices compatible with IMS incorporate a SIP user agent that is 
used to place voice or video calls toward the network. 
 
The  control layer  of the IMS network consists of nodes for managing  call establishment, 
management, and release, namely the Call Session Control Function (CSCF), performed by: 
Proxy  (P-CSCF), Interrogating (I-CSCF) and  Serving (S-CSCF). Before the user can use 
the services from the IMS network it must authenticate itself, by performing a registration. 
The subscriber  data of every user is located in the Home Subscriber  Service (HSS), which 
acts as a Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server, providing a central 
repository of user-related information.  The P-CSCF is the link of the User Element (UE) to 
the IMS network, receiving all the signaling traffic from/for the user, allowing access only 
to registered users.  The S-CSCF performs routing traffic towards other networks, manages 
billing and session expiration intervals, and interrogates the HSS to retrieve authorization, 
service triggering  information and  user profile.  The  I-CSCF  is in charge  of querying  the 
HSS if a specific user is present at the HSS and  which S-CSCF  the HSS has allocated for 
it. 
 
IMS applications are  hosted in the service layer.   This  layer  consists of SIP  Application 
Servers (AS) which provides the end user service logic. The (AS) execute IMS applications 
and  services by manipulating  SIP  signaling  and  interfacing  with  other  systems.  Usually, 
the AS will offer a programming language  and  framework  for creating new services,  for 
example Java SIP and HTTP Servlets. 
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2.2  Emergency Services Support  for IMS 
 
This  overview  is based  on  the existing 3GPP  releases  7 and  8 specifications.   Release  7 was 
declared frozen in TSG SA 36 in June 2007. In this release, emergency calls for IMS are supported. 
Within this context, 3GPP has set the requirements from both the service and regulatory points 
of view and  are  described  in [5].   The  emergency  architecture  specification  is described  in [6] 
and  the corresponding  protocol requirements and  details are discussed in the 3GPP  documents 
[5] and  [7].   The  emergency  support framework  for IMS is depicted in Figure  2 and  could  be 
summarized  in the following points (for more details, we refer to [5]): 
 
Emergency  IMS registration:  can be used only to place emergency calls. 
 
If the User Equipment (UE)  has already  retrieved its location information, it will include 
it in the initial request of the emergency call. 
 
Otherwise the P-CSCF might query for the user location from the access network and refer 
it in the request.  Then  forward the request to the Emergency  CSCF  (E-CSCF). 
 
Upon  receiving  the emergency  related SIP  message by the E-CSCF,  in case no location 
information was provided,  the E-CSCF  will query the Location Retrieval Function (LRF) 
for the user  location.   The  LRF  may  contain  or interface  with  a Routing  Determination 
Function (RDF), ensuring that the E-CSCF  will receive the most appropriate Public Safety 
Answering Point (PSAP) URI, e.g. Police call taker. Then  the emergency SIP message is 
forwarded  further to this PSAP.  The  emergency  support for IMS also provides  a general 
mechanism  to deal with the callback issue. 
 
Depending  on the user  privacy,  the PSAP  client  can  extract the location  from the SIP 
message or can get the updated one using the Le interface. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2: The emergency support framework  for IMS 
 
 
 
2.3  Security  Issues in  Emergency Services 
 
In the literature, the work on security for emergency  calls is very scarce.   So far,  only [8] has 
discussed  the security threats as well as the setting of requirements to deal  with them.   The 
attacks and  misuse  scenarios  that the mentioned  characteristics  can  cause,  described  in  [8], 
could be summarized  in the following points: 
 
A semantic  threat  is a wrong indication of the emergency location, either by false testimony 
by the user or by manipulation of the calling device that automatically provides the location 
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information (e.g.   a  GPS  device).   This  can  be  exploited in  different situations.   In  
an emergency situation, an attacker can try to prevent help reaching its destination, by 
leading help resources to wrong locations. 
 
Prioritized traffic,  especially  combined  with unauthenticated access  is an ideal target for 
misuse.   Fraudsters can  try to misuse the system by using  the emergency  indicator into 
normal  calls, e.g. during  New Year celebrations. 
 
Breaching the emergency indicator system would also allow attacks on the entire emergency 
system, e.g. a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack by flooding 
 
An  attack at the mapping  service  might rend  the emergency  service not operational or 
emergency  calls might  be wrongly  routed,  with  the same  effect  as described  in the first 
topic.  There  are basically  three possibilities  to attack this  node:  launching  a DoS attack 
on it, gaining  access to it or launching  a Man-in-the-Middle attack between it and  any 
contact point 
 
Emergency  information is also sensitive information. It has to be ensured  that emergency 
traffic can not be snooped.  Attacks can also be conducted in indirect ways.  An example 
of how to disturb  the service  without  actually  launching  an  attack is to broadcast  the 
(wrong) information that the 911 or 112 system is down and unresponsive.  People will get 
interested or even panic and try to reach the emergency system to check if it’s true. This 
may cause an indirect Denial-of-Service attack by hogging all available  emergency lines. 
 
RFC  5069 is without doubt a good starting point to implement built-in security mechanisms  in 
the emergency  services support for VoIP  networks.  However, it should  be mentioned that this 
RFC  stays a high  level work and  some of the scenarios  described  there might fail to occur  in 
special environments like IMS. 
 
2.4  Denial-of-Service Attacks and  IMS 
 
DoS attacks are a common security threat in the Internet trying to utilise the target’s available 
resources with the aim of rendering  the offered service unavailable [16].  These  resources might 
be bandwidth, CPU or memory.  Such threats can also occur in the IMS environments, however, 
some appropriate application-layer attacks will be used. 
In previous  papers  the vulnerabilities  that allow dedicated  SIP  attacks to occur have been 
listed [16], [18], [19].  Basically  these are missing or wrongly applied  sender  authentication for 
packets, software errors in SIP implementations or poorly designed implementations that allow 
resource depletion to occur. 
When talking about a DoS attack, one generally means flooding attacks that overwhelm the 
victim’s resources.  In our case, flooding can be achieved with different SIP messages (emergency 
INVITE,  emergency  REGISTER, etc.)   and  the attack can  be launched  from a single source 
or from multiple  sources.   The  latter is called a Distributed  Denial-of- Service (DDoS)  attack 
where  the attacker employs  a large  number  of (usually  unaware) computers with different IP 
addresses  to generate a higher-bandwidth stream of messages than would be possible from one 
single machine. 
An Emergency  Registration attack can be generated as a wellformed REGISTER request is 
processed and generates a transaction at least on the P-CSCF and I-CSCF,  because the P-CSCF 
does not check if the user that registeres really exists.  Only after interrogating the HSS about 
the user identity  can the I-CSCF  decline the registration.  In this  way registration for spoofed 
users could be used to attack the P-CSCF of the attached network or the I-CSCF  and  HSS of 
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the home network.  Another vulnerabilty could be when the network has a policy of accepting 
anonymous  emergency calls.  This means the requests that include the emergency indicator and 
belong to a (potential) dialog will be forwarded by the P-CSCF to the E-CSCF  without verifying 
user authentication.  Based on this, a DoS attack could target the P-CSCF and the components 
handling  the emergency call, e.g. the E-CSCF.  In case the malicious emergency INVITE  contains 
location information the attack could include  also the mapping  service and  even the PSAP,  by 
occupying all the call-takers.  The  mapping  service could be enhanced  with  a method to verify 
the validity of the location information for a authenticated user, based on the associated IP, but 
for an anonymous  emergency  call this will not be possible, instead a semantic checking can be 
carried out. 
Furthermore,  attacks where source IP  addresses  in packets  are spoofed to escape detection 
can be considered to be a kind of distributed attack. This means also that although the semantic 
check might eliminate the attacks with location information coming from a valid IP,  it will not 
prevent the processing of the INVITE  request on the P-CSCF, E-CSCF  and LRF in attacks with 
spoofed IPs. 
 
2.5  Firewalls 
 
A firewall is a network  security  component  deployed  at the border  of the network.   Incoming 
and  possibly  outgoing traffic is examined  at the firewall according  to security policies.   The 
security policies define what kind of traffic will be forwarded or dropped at the firewall. Stallings 
[20] defines three  common  firewall types,  depending  on the layer  they  are  operating:   packet- 
filters (network-layer), application-layer gateways (application layer)  or circuit-level gateways 
(application layer,  session level).   The  essential part of a firewall is the implementation of its 
security-policy  handling.   Generally,  security  policies are given as firewall rules  in the form of 
”if condition  then  action”.   Here,  condition  is related  to the packet  currently  being  examined 
and  could be a comparison  to an IP  address,  port or certain  content  in the message payload, 
for example.  Action consists of either accepting or discarding  the examined  packet. All defined 
firewall rules  form  its rule  set.   Rules  can  be  static, e.g.   the network security operator has 
defined  these rules  manually,  or updated dynamically  by  a firewall controller - commonly  an 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  For each passing packet, the firewall searches the rule set for 
applying  rules (the condition matches the examined  packet), and performs the defined action on 
the packet. 
 
2.6  Greylisting 
 
Greylisting [15]  is a  complementary mechanism  to white and  black  lists used  in  email  spam 
prevention.  When  a message is received by an email server from a sender  that is not listed on 
a white or a black  list then the message  is rejected temporarily.  Senders  that implement the 
Simple Mail Transfer  Protocol (SMTP) [21] specification would hence correctly retry sending the 
message later.  The re-transmitted message would then be accepted by the server and forwarded 
to the client.  Thus greylisting is based on the assumption that SPAM software is rather simple 
and  is optimised to send a lot of messages but does not care about re-transmissions. This  way, 
messages from legal users would never be dropped unnecessarily  and would always be forwarded 
to the receivers, albeit a bit delayed, while messages from spammers  are dropped with very little 
effort. 
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3 Related  Works 
 
As mentioned in  section   2.3,  RFC  5069 discusses  the security threats and  requirements for 
emergency calls making, however, no concrete solution is provided.  In [43], we tried to concretize 
more this RFC by showing some practical attacks (related to the missuse of the emergency iden- 
tifier) that can occur against the IMS-based  emergency framework  as well as the corresponding 
solutions.   The  current  paper  is the continuation  of such  activities  where  another  security  is- 
sue (flooding attacks) is considered.  It is worth to mention that even the solution suggested in 
this paper  is bound  to the IMS-based  emergency framework,  it can be used for any SIP service 
regardless  the infrastructure on top of which it is deployed (IMS or not). 
Our  work addresses  the Denial-of-Service  vulnerability  on the P-CSCF component  as it  is 
the entry point to the IMS network and in particular to the emergency framework. 
DoS handling  strategies have been discussed in literature in various forms.  As there are both 
multiple  and  different  types  of DoS attacks, there  is no unique  solution  that is able  to cover 
all types of attacks [16].  Different approaches  have therefore been proposed.  Initial approaches 
for DoS protection have  been  simple  rate-limiting algorithms that allow a  limited number  of 
requests  per  time  interval  from each sending  IP  address  [23].   These  mechanisms  are  effective 
for singlesource DoS attacks but fail for highly distributed  DDoS attacks.  Furthermore, it  has 
been shown in [24] that such mechanisms  prove to be a target for a self-inflicted DoS. Several 
researchers  have  proposed  mechanisms  to detect Denial-of-Service  attacks using state-machine 
specifications  [12],[25],[9].   Here SIP  state machines  are  modelled  for Transactions  or Sessions 
and  every SIP  message is evaluated within the state machine  whether it deviates from the SIP 
specification ([12], [25]) or depending  on which timings occur in the state machine  [9].  These 
mechanisms  are helpful against single-source DoS attacks and can also detect DDoS attacks, but 
without the possibility of mitigating DDoS attacks. Other researchers have developed lightweight 
statistical algorithms to detect DDoS attacks, e.g. by using Hellinger Distance calculation [14] or 
calculating cumulative sums [11], [13]. These algorithms can successfully detect DoS and DDoS 
attacks on SIP proxies, but do not allow any prevention mechanisms.  A final group of researchers 
are focussing on developing combined solutions to detect multiple types of attacks [26], [27],[28], 
however none of them are able to deliver DDoS mitigation mechanisms. 
DDoS mitigation on SIP  proxies is a hard  problem  to resolve.  Until now, next to our work 
we are  only  aware  of one other  proposal  for handling  DDoS attacks on SIP  proxies.   Nagpal 
et al.  [29] propose a null-authentication mechanism  where all unknown  requests are challenged 
with  a SIP  authentication  message  that every  regular  VoIP  client  will be able  to handle  but 
that attackers will generally  not be able to process.  Our  work is based on similar assumptions, 
however it has the advantage that no additional proxy is necessary to actively generate requests, 
thus lowering processing overheads.  In this paper  we do not address  further SIP vulnerabilities. 
Other researchers  have proposed mechanisms  to handle message tampering (e.g.  [30]), fraud and 
billing attacks (e.g.  [31]) or VoIP SPIT  (e.g.  [32]). 
 
 
4 Proposed  Solution  for Prevention 
 
Our  proposed  mechanism  works as follows:  a firewall with  pinholing  capabilities  is positioned 
in front of the P-CSCF that needs to be protected, as this entity is the entry point to the IMS 
network.  There is no need to correlate the pinholing information from multiple P-CSCFs in order 
to exclude the harmless users, because all the traffic of the same non-malicious user will be sent to 
the same P-CSCF used for registration.  Our software solution can have one or muliple monitoring 
targets as it is build on a fully scalable monitoring architecture.  It can be deployed just on one 
or more machines  to scale to higher  network loads.  The  firewall is initially configured to block 
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all incoming requests destined to a P-CSCF, i.e. no pinholes are established. Any arbitrary but 
regular SIP User Agent (UA) sending a SIP request to a P-CSCF (for example an emergency or 
non-emergency INVITE  or a REGISTER request) will have this request discarded at the firewall. 
However,  afterwards  the firewall establishes  a pinhole  so that further  requests  with  a relation 
to this UA shall pass the firewall unhindered. Thus,  further communication of this UA will not 
be affected.   Because  of SIP’s  defined re-transmission algorithm,  it  is guaranteed  that the UA 
will automatically re-transmit all SIP messages that have been initially blocked by the pinholing 
firewall.  Consequently, the UA’s re-transmission message will pass through the created pinhole 
to the P-CSCF, thus  the communication channel  is established.  After  some time  of inactivity 
(i.e.  no traffic passing through this pinhole)  the generated pinhole is closed at the firewall.  The 
schematic overview is depicted in Figure 3. A DoS attack on the other hand  strives for effective 
binding  of all  resources  at the SIP  server,  like the one  from  the P-CSCF, e.g.   through the 
establishment of as many different transactions as possible (for example by launching  a memory 
depletion attack as described  above).  Hence, for effective resource depletion the attacker needs 
to initiate multiple different transactions, which will all be blocked by the access firewall. Only if 
the attacker UA conforms to the SIP specification and  re-sends all previous  requests (meaning, 
it also implements a  message  timeout detection scheme),  will it be  able  to pass  through the 
pinholing  firewall. 
 
 
 
Figure  3: Pinholing  process overview 
 
A key component of this mechanism  for a successful prevention will be the method for cre- 
ating pinhole  rules  at the perimeter firewall,  e.g.   which  parameters should  be considered  for 
specifying the pinholes.  Here we are considering different possibilities for the pinhole parameter. 
If we consider  a basic  attack tool,  it  is likely that it  will generate  attack traffic  with  spoofed 
source IP  addresses.   This  is necessary,  as otherwise the attack will be filtered out by common 
security solutions. Most commercial SIP security products (e.g.  Borderware  SIP Assure [33]) use 
threshold-based prevention mechanisms  against DoS. This is achieved by allowing only a limited 
number  of requests  from one source  within  a given time  frame.   However,  such  a mechanism 
is not effective against messages with spoofed IP  addresses.   For  the pinholing  algorithm to be 
effective against such attacks, the pinhole  parameter can simply  be the source IP  address,  i.e. 
every first message from one given IP address  will be dropped,  while further requests from this 
same address  will pass through (see Figure  4).  With this pinhole parameter, prevention is also 
possible for DDoS attacks with real IP addresses  if the attack generation tools does not imple- 
ment the correct SIP retransmission method. However, with the IP address  as the only pinhole 
parameter, it  would be ineffective  if attackers were to initiate multiple requests with  their  real 
 
 
 
 
	
			
 	
 	
 
 
IP  address  or with  random  but fixed spoofed IP  addresses.   In this  case only the first  request 
would be blocked while all further requests could pass unhindered  through the newly generated 
pinhole.  To cope with this situation, the pinhole parameter can also be modified to consider the 
transaction or session ID (i.e.  evaluating the relevant Via, or Call-ID  header  fields and  tags in 
the SIP message) as the pinhole parameter, thus only allowing messages from the same context 
to pass the firewall. 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4: Pinholing  overview.  The  adaptive firewall blocks all new requests.  A pinhole  is only 
opened after a request re-transmission and then traffic passes through it unhindered. 
 
It is possible for an intelligent attacker to circumvent this method.  However, to achieve this 
the attack tool needs to be more complex, and thus becomes less effective:  instead of using the 
full given bandwidth capacity to generate different requests, it has to re-send previous messages. 
As an attacker will not know how many  requests have to be sent to finally pass the prevention 
mechanism,  its individual  attack power decreases with every re-send:  assuming  an attacker can 
generate 1000 attack requests per second, it would only be able to pass 500 individual  requests 
if all of them have to be repeated.  This  number  would further decrease  if the attacker had  to 
repeat requests more than two times. The generated pinholes should later be removed from the 
firewall to free up resources and to speed up firewall performance.  Note that for DoS protection 
it  is not  absolutely  necessary  to close the pinholes  immediately:   an  attack can  only ”hit” an 
open pinhole by coincidence, and a more sophisticated attack would also pass an already  closed 
pinhole.   Also,  if pinholes  are  closed  too  early,  regular  users  are  also  affected,  as  they  have 
to re-open  the pinhole.   As REGISTER messages are recurring  messages sent by the UA, the 
pinhole should be at least open for the common register refresh time (which defaults to one hour). 
Note:  The  pinholing  mechanism  works for UDP  transport, which is the dominant form of SIP 
transportation and likely to be used in attack scenarios.  SIP does not use its own re-transmission 
feature when sending over a reliable protocol like TCP,  here the re-transmission feature of TCP 
is used instead. 
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5 Implementation  and Testbed 
 
For  testing,  we have  implemented  a pinholing  prototype  using  the VoIP  Defender  framework 
[34].  VoIP  Defender  is a general SIP security framework  allowing rapid  prototyping of different 
SIP  security  applications.   It provides  a network  sniffer,  packet  reassembly,  a SIP  parser  and 
the possibility to add  security algorithms as shared  libraries.   When  security incidents occur, 
notifications can  be generated or a firewall can  be controlled to be updated with new access 
policies.  VoIP Defender runs on Linux machines and controls an enhanced  version of the default 
Linux firewall iptables. VoIP  Defender  passively sniffs traffic passing to and  from the host that 
should  be  protected.   Contrary  to a  Session Border  Controller  (SBC)  it  does  not  operate  as 
a proxy  but as a traffic repeater.   Thus  it is completely invisible  to the attacker (except the 
iptables firewall),  which makes it difficult for attackers to launch  a direct attack against VoIP 
Defender  itself.   For  the pinholing  mechanism,  VoIP  Defender  captures  all traffic  to and  from 
a SIP  proxy  and  forwards  it to the pinholing  algorithm module.   The  pinhole  database from 
Figure 3 is managed  directly there. The VoIP Defender firewall controller is then responsible for 
installing and removing pinholing  rules at the used firewall (see Figure 5).  Rules are updated at 
the firewall as soon as the incidents occur.  Note, that while tests have only been conducted with 
VoIP Defender, the actual pinhole mechanism  should also work in other security frameworks like 
IDS or SBC. 
 
 
 
Figure  5: VoIP Defender internal structure 
 
VoIP  Defender  with the pinholing  algorithm is deployed  within our  security testbed using 
multiple Dell Xeon servers running  the Linux operating system.  Incoming  traffic and  internal 
connections are routed over Gigabit Ethernet lines and switches. For the attack target we have 
deployed  the Emergency  Branch  of the Open  IMS Core  [39] with  one P-CSCF. The  P-CSCF 
acts  as SIP  proxy  based  on the SIP  Express  Router  (SER)  [35].  We use an enhanced  version 
of the SIPp  traffic generator tool [36] to create background or ”normal” SIP traffic utilising the 
IMS network.  SIPp  allows traffic scenarios  to be automatically generated in a predefined  way. 
It acts as a common UA to initiate and respond to requests.  Our enhancements to SIPp include 
the possibility to create random  events in the scenario  and  diversifying  reply  messages  using 
regular expressions.  We use this to simulate regular users that call each other randomly.  We use 
an internal developed  tool that is able to generate SIP  messages with spoofed IP  addresses  to 
simulate  DoS attacks.  This  traffic is directed  towards the P-CSCF with  the aim of disturbing 
proxy operation.  The testbed setup can be seen in Figure   6. 
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Figure  6: Testbed setup 
 
 
6 Test runs 
 
We  created an  operation evaluation scenario  and  a  performance  evaluation scenario.   In  the 
operation evaluation scenario we prove the general operation of the mechanism,  whereas in the 
performance  scenario we push the implementation to its limits. 
For the operation evaluation scenario, we launch the SIPp background generator from multiple 
hosts to register different UAs at the IMS network through the P-CSCF and  initiate random 
emergency and non-emergency  SIP INVITE  requests.  Then we start an attack with the attacker 
tool, by generating similar  random  requests with spoofed IP  addresses  starting at a rather low 
rate of 20 calls  / second.   During  the entire attack the goal is to establish all  user-initiated 
requests  from SIPp  (i.e.  no false positives)  and  to block all attack-generated requests  (i.e.  no 
false negatives)  at the firewall.   Rules  are  generated  at VoIP  Defender’s  firewall controller  in 
real-time:  as soon as a new SIP request is encountered, a new firewall pinholing  rule is created 
and forwarded to the firewall to be installed there.  The test shows that all regular users are able 
to successfully pass the protection solution. 
In the next step we measure  the delay in processing a regular  user’s call, i.e.  by taking the 
time between the initial request from the UA and the received answer from the P-CSCF. Without 
the protection solution established, this delay in the testbed is on average 0.21 s for emergency 
calls containing the location information and 0.14 for non-emergency  calls. With the protection 
solution established, this delay increases to an average value of 0.71 s and 0.64 respectively.  This 
delay  is of course  due  to the first  request  being  blocked  by  the firewall,  and  only the second 
re-transmission request being able to pass the firewall pinhole.  The SIP specification states that 
the first retransmission message should be generated after T1 s, where T1 is the calculated RTT 
or 500 ms, which is exactly what we witness  in the test (Note,  that SIPp  does not seem to do 
an RTT  calculation and just uses the default value of 500 ms for T1). 
In the second test we measure the performance  of the mechanism and its influence on latency. 
From  the previous  test we know already  the the system works correctly.  Hence, it is sufficient 
to launch  the attack alone to generate a high load of requests.  We evaluate if the firewall can 
handle all requests, i.e. dynamically  update the firewall table in real-time as requests arrive.  In 
this test, we configure the attack generator to emit 10000 SIP requests at a rate of 500 msg/s, as 
such a rate would already  put a provider  system under  high stress.  Note that the limiting factor 
here for the SIP proxy of the P-CSCF is mainly processing speed and memory consumption, and 
not bandwidth usage.   All tests are repeated 10 times, to minimise  measurement errors.   The 
results from this scenario can be seen in Figure   7. The figure shows that VoIP Defender indeed 
generates all 10000 firewall pinholes as expected, i.e. there are no false negatives. 
However, as more rules are added  to the firewall, rule adding  latency increases considerably. 
In a real-time scenario, rules should be effective as soon as new SIP requests are encountered.  In 
the introduced scenario with 10000 SIP  requests at a rate of 500 msg/s, ideally after about 20 
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Figure  7: Time to install 10000 rules at the pinholing  firewall 
 
 
seconds all rules should have been installed at the firewall. However, the tests show that the last 
rule is added nearly 3 minutes after the last attack request was generated. This is a considerable 
delay and  would have grave consequences  for network traffic.  In the theoretical case that only 
one regular  user  would contact the P-CSCF just after these 10000 attack messages have  been 
generated, it would take the client three minutes before a contact with the IMS network would 
have been established.  This  is however a theoretical value - according  to the SIP  specification, 
a calling UA terminates  an INVITE  request  after  around  30 s (depending  on RTT,  and  given 
that the calling  human  operator would  not have  given up  before).   During  this time the UA 
would also have generated ca.  7 re-transmission requests.  Evidently,  this  is not  an acceptable 
use case, and due to the additionally generated re-transmission requests, the load on the defence 
node would even be increased.  Upon examining the setup, we identify the iptables based firewall 
engine controlled by VoIP  Defender  as the performance  bottleneck.  While  rules are generated 
without delay at the firewall controller in VoIP Defender, iptables cannot process these requests 
in realtime.   The  standard Linux  firewall iptables  works considerably  well with  a small  set  of 
static rules, but has known performance  problems with an increasing rule set size and rules that 
are dynamically  updated [37, 38, 40]. Within our test runs, there is no great difference in latency 
performance  between different iterations of the test, i.e.  derivation from the average  case was 
minimal.   This  further confirms  that the encountered low performance  is not due  to network 
problems  and indeed results from iptables’ rule processing. 
 
 
7 Optimization 
 
The low performance  of iptables is mainly due to its costly memory copy operation. As already 
described,  VoIP  Defender  sends a rule update request in real time, i.e.  as soon as the pinhole 
mechanism  decides  that a  rule  update  (rule  insert  / delete)  is necessary.   However,  for each 
new rule that is modified at the iptables  firewall, the whole current  firewall rule set  has to be 
copied from kernel-space  to user-space,  where the rule set is updated. Then,  the new rule set is 
copied back to kernel-space where it is installed in the actual iptables firewall to become effective. 
Kernel-space to user-space copy operations in Linux are a costly operation.  Hence, such a process 
would be acceptable for static rule entries,  however it  is not feasible in our case with  dynamic 
rule  updates in  real  time.   We  therefore propose  another solution:  instead of updating rules 
immediately after they are generated by VoIP Defender, they are accumulated at VoIP Defender 
for a short time, so that a collection of rule update requests can be transferred to the firewall in 
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one control message.  These update requests are scheduled  periodically,  e.g.  every second.  As a 
consequence,  the iptables firewall can avoid multiple costly memory  copy operations, as it can 
update multiple rule set entries in just one memory copy operation. 
This method however has an effect on regular  users as the pinholes for regular  users are not 
established  immediately  after  the user’s  initial  request,  but only after  a scheduled  rule update 
push  occurred.   However,  this  effect  only affects  the signalling  path and  in effect  might  cause 
both a short and acceptable delay at the sender side before the caller hears the waiting tone.  We 
therefore modify the VoIP  Defender  firewall controller to accumulate individual  rules and  send 
out combined update control messages in 1 second intervals.  The performance  increase with the 
same scenario is depicted in Figure 8. As can be seen in the figure, the update process is close to 
the optimum case - the best-case scenario actually matches the optimum case.  Even the worst 
test  run  is only slightly  behind  schedule:  While  10000 messages are generated within  20 s, all 
rules are installed at VoIP Defender after just about 21 s, in comparison to the nearly 200 s delay 
in the original setup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  8: Time to install 10000 rules at the pinholing  firewall (optimised version) 
 
As the optimised  version  works reasonably  well, we run  another  attack with  50000 attack 
messages.  The results are shown in Figure  9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  9: Time to install 50000 rules at the pinholing  firewall (optimised version) 
 
With this setup, we can see that iptables can handle up to around 18000 rules in real-time.  If 
further rules are added,  latency increases, resulting now in a rule installation delay of 68 s in the 
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worst case. Clearly this test shows that iptables is not the perfect tool to be used as the firewall 
component, even after applying  optimisation strategies. For comparison  we summarise  the rule- 
adding  speed of the three tests in Table  1. This table shows iptables’ rule-adding  capabilities at 
the beginning  of each test (without any previous rules established at iptables) and again at the 
end of each test.  The  figures are calculated  from the lowest  performing  test run  to indicate  a 
worst-case scenario. 
 
Table  1: Worst case rule adding  capacities 
 
init.  speed fin. speed 
r/t rule addition, 10000 rules 
1 s delay addition, 10000 rules 
1 s delay addition, 50000 rules 
191 r/s 
500 r/s 
499 r/s 
28 r/s 
433 r/s 
184 r/s 
 
While we have shown that the mechanism works as expected, it is evident that iptables cannot 
cope with the generated traffic load.  To circumvent this, one option could be to replace iptables 
with another firewall solution with better performance  (e.g., software iptables replacements like 
ipset [41]  or  nf-HIPAC  [42]  or  even  a  hardware-based solution).   On  the other  hand,   other 
optimisation options exist that could  work even with an  iptables based  solution.  One  option 
would  be  to create the pinhole  not after the first request, but after the first re-
transmission message is encountered.  In this case, the amount of generated firewall rules would be 
significantly reduced; for the target case of spoofed message attack prevention it is very likely 
that no firewall rules would be generated at all.  On the other  hand,  regular  users would 
encounter  a minimal delay in message processing.  Given an arbitrary UA sending  an INVITE  
to the IMS network, its first re-transmission message would be generated after T 1 s. After this 
message, the pinhole 
would be generated,  so that the second re-transmission message after  2 T 1 s could reach  the
 
P-CSCF unhindered by the firewall. Hence, given a responsive proxy the user would experience 
a delay usually shorter than 2 s, before its request would be processed regularly.  Such a delay is 
not uncommon  for a voice scenario, e.g. in mobile call establishments, and thus would likely not 
irritate the user. 
 
 
8 Future Work 
 
The emergency call delay is bigger than the non-emergency one because it includes also a location 
parsing  and  database query  for the nearest PSAP  URI.  In the near  future we are considering 
analysing  the performances  of the Emergency  Branch  of Open  IMS Core  in order  to find out 
what could be the possible optimisations of the message processing during  an emergency call. 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
In  this work we have  presented a simple  but effective solution to defend  special  kinds  of dis- 
tributed Denialof- Service attacks on SIP  based  networks, particularly IMS. The  solution adds 
a marginally  longer delay for regular  users, but keeps the proxy entity, in this case the P-CSCF, 
safe from overhead  traffic.  One ma jor problem  we have encountered is the low performance  of 
the used Linux iptables firewall, which is neither capable  of handling  dynamic  rule modification 
nor scales well beyond  20000 rules  in  real-time scenarios.   While  we have  shown  the general 
feasibility of our defence mechanism,  further stressing it does not seem to be a prudent choice, 
as long as iptables is still involved.   Iptables’ limitations show despite our  implemented opti- 
misations.  Nevertheless,  we have proven  the effectiveness  of the general  mechanism,  so with  a 
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higher performance  firewall system, particularly with a hardware-based firewall, it should easily 
cope with an even higher load.  With such a system, pinholing on the transaction or session level 
instead of just on the IP address level would make the system even more effective.  This algorithm 
can  handle  a certain  type  of DoS attack - for effective  mitigation,  different  algorithms  should 
be combined,  e.g.  utilisation of a lightweight detection scheme (e.g.  [13]) to detect DoS traffic, 
and  activate special mitigation schemes like this  pinholing  solution  only if an attack condition 
has been detected.  The  pinholing  mechanism  is therefore an ideal (complementary) companion 
to common  threshold-based protection schemes.   A defence solution combining  the pinholing 
mechanism  with other DoS protection mechanisms  should therefore increase the security of the 
protected host considerably.   We are continuing our research  into optimum mitigation schemes 
under  different attack conditions. 
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